Today in the History of Eretz Israel – Feb 7th: The Table That Wasn't Round: The Absurd Theater of 1939 and the Moment the Gates Were Locked
- Nir Topper
- 6 hours ago
- 4 min read
Today, it might seem entirely normal to us, but in 1939, it was a chaotic fiasco: an international peace conference where one side refused to even acknowledge the existence of the other—to the point where the hosts had to smuggle delegations through separate doors to avoid awkward encounters in the hallways. It sounds like a scene from a political comedy (or a realistic drama of our lives in the 21st century), but in February 1939, at St. James's Palace in London, this was the grim reality.
Britain, in a desperate last-ditch attempt to prevent a flare-up in the Middle East just moments before World War II, convened what was cynically dubbed the "Round Table Conference." However, there was no shared table; instead, we got "revolving door diplomacy," with British ministers running from room to room, relaying messages between an Arab delegation that refused to sit with the "Zionists," and a Jewish delegation fighting for its life.
The background to the gathering was bleak and terrifyingly calculated. The Chamberlain government, which championed the policy of "Appeasement" vis-à-vis Hitler in Europe, decided to apply the same cynical approach to the Middle East. The British fear was that an Arab revolt in Palestine would endanger the Suez Canal and oil resources just as Germany was rearming. The cold British assumption was that the Jews would support Britain anyway because they had no other choice against the Nazis; therefore, the Arabs—the "swing vote"—had to be bought at any price. Thus, the conference became not only a foregone failure but an arena where Zionist interests were sacrificed on the altar of British Realpolitik.
One of the most dangerous innovations at the conference was the "Pan-Arabization" of the conflict. For the first time, Britain invited to the negotiating table not only the Arabs of Palestine but also representatives from Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. What was perhaps intended to moderate Palestinian positions achieved the opposite result: the Arab states, fearing public opinion at home, radicalized their stances and demanded the end of the Mandate and a halt to Jewish immigration. The Jewish delegation, led by Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, stood by in shock. While Weizmann tried to maintain a diplomatic line, Ben-Gurion understood which way the wind was blowing and began to formulate the concept of "Fighting Zionism": the realization that there is no point in futile negotiations and that statehood must be taken, not requested.
The absurdity reached its peak when it became clear that the Arabs rejected any compromise that did not include an immediate Arab state over the entire territory. On March 7th, in a daring attempt to break the ice, the British managed to convene a rare informal meeting between Zionist leaders and representatives of Arab states. In the closed room, representatives of Egypt and Iraq tried to tempt Ben-Gurion to renounce immigration in exchange for "protected minority" status. His answer was unequivocal: We will not live at the mercy of others. The explosion was inevitable. The Jewish delegation left London with a stinging sense of betrayal, and the British were left with a unilateral decision that had been prepared in advance.
The direct result of the conference was the "White Paper" of May 1939, a document many view as a death sentence for tens of thousands of Jews. The White Paper limited immigration to only 75,000 people over five years and stipulated that any further immigration would require Arab consent. The timing was horrific: at the exact moment when European Jewry desperately needed a haven, the British locked the gates. Yet, incredibly, the Palestinian leadership led by the Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini rejected the White Paper. They wanted everything, immediately, and without a single additional Jew. Historians view this as the greatest tactical error in the history of the Palestinian national movement—missing out on a state that was within reach.
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For the Jewish leadership, the failure of the St. James Conference was a moment of painful but necessary disillusionment. It marked the end of illusions regarding the alliance with Britain and the beginning of the independent struggle. Ben-Gurion formulated it in the immortal sentence that would accompany the Yishuv throughout the war: "We must assist the British in the war as if there were no White Paper, and we must resist the White Paper as if there were no war." Out of this great fracture, and from the understanding that we have no one to rely on but ourselves, grew the determination that ultimately led to the establishment of the State in 1948.
Diplomatic opportunities can turn into double-edged swords, and stubborn political refusal ("all or nothing") often leads to losing everything. The tragedy of 1939 is a reminder of the destructive power of extremism, and the heavy price paid by entire peoples because of leaders who refused to look reality in the eye—or sit around the same table. And I am convinced that every political angle, from every political spectrum, will take these words to justify its own path.
Image: The Round Table Conference, The Jewish Delegation. Source: Wikipedia.
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